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Abstract
Think tanks, defined as organizations that produce policy research for political purposes (McGann, 2007; Medvetz, 2008),
are an increasingly ubiquitous type of policy actor world-wide. In Sweden, the last 20 years’ sharp increase in think tank
numbers (Åberg, Einarsson, & Reuter, 2019) has coincided with the decline of the traditional Swedish corporatist model
based on the intimate involvement of the so-called ‘popular movements’ in policy-making (Lundberg, 2014; Micheletti,
1995). Contrary to the large, mass-membership based and democratically organized movement organizations, think tanks
are small, professionalized, expert-based, and seldom represent any larger membership base. Their increasingly impor-
tant role as the ideological greenhouses in Swedish civil society might, therefore, be interpreted as an indication of an
increasingly elitist and professionalized character of the latter. But what is a think tank? The article explores how a shared
understanding of what constitutes a think tank is constructed by think-tankers themselves. In the study, interviewed think
tank executives and top-level staff reflect upon their own organizations’ missions and place in the Swedish policy system.
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1. Introduction
In the last two decades, the increasing proliferation
of independent organizations trading in policy advice
has attracted growing attention in the social sciences.
Being originally an Anglo-Saxon (and particularly U.S.
American) phenomenon, policy institutes or ‘think tanks’
are today ubiquitous in most countries, as well as at the
global level, across the whole spectrum of policy fields
(Rich, 2004; Stone, 1997). While they are often analysed
primarily as actors in policy systems, these organizations
are also part of civil society. This is due not only to their
legal form which often is that of associations or founda-
tions, but above all to the fact that think tanks work by
diffusing ideas, and their operations usually aim at influ-
encing societal development in some form. As such, think
tanks fit well into a neo-Gramscian view of civil society
which highlights this sphere’s normative, ideational, and
discursive dimensions (e.g., Reuter, Wijkström, & Meyer,
2015; Wijkström & Reuter, 2015). Generation and dis-
semination of, as well as mobilization around, ideas and
ideologies, which is at the centre of what think tanks do,
is, according to this perspective, a trademark of civil so-
ciety actors.
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Think tanks are, however, a particular type of civil so-
ciety organization: They lack individual membership, are
often established and funded by other actors in civil soci-
ety, and their raison d’être and legitimacy as policy actors
are based on expertise rather than on being anchored in
particular segments of the broader society. In contrast
to many types of grassroots oriented organizations tra-
ditionally associated with civil society, think tanks build
their claim to influence not on interest representation
or community but on a carefully negotiated balance be-
tween expertise and opinion, or between knowledge and
ideology. As highly professionalized organizations, often
run and staffed by individuals with high academic creden-
tials, think tanks are therefore often conceptualized in
the extant literature as a distinctly elitist type of political
and policy actor (e.g., Fischer, 1991; Savage, 2016; Smith,
1991; Stone, 2001).
What is a think tank, though? The literature notes
frequently that defining these organizations is a noto-
riously difficult task, the think tank concept being slip-
pery, distinctly empirical, and hard to pinpoint analyti-
cally. Moreover, the term ‘think tank’ is often used by
organizations to strategically position themselves at the
crossroads of different institutional fields (Hauck, 2017;
Medvetz, 2012), but also to put into question the legit-
imacy of rival organizations. What a think tank is, is in
many cases a matter of what suits the actors involved.
It is therefore relevant to examine how these organiza-
tions themselves discursively construct the ‘think tank’
as a type of civil society and policy actor. And, as the in-
stitutional context in which think tanks operate is crucial
for the character of the niche they occupy in civil soci-
ety and in the policy system (Åberg, Einarsson, & Reuter,
2019; Kelstrup, 2016), it is also relevant to highlight the
importance of such context for the way in which these
organizations define themselves.
This article aims to explore how think tanks, or rather
‘think-tankers’ (the people involved in the organizations
in different capacities) themselves construct an idea of
what a think tank is and how its purpose(s) should be
understood in relation to the wider institutional environ-
ment.While this question has been previously addressed
with a focus on the U.S. American setting (Medvetz,
2010), our interest lies in the self-understanding of think
tanks in contexts where this type of civil society and pol-
icy actor is relatively new, and where think tank(er)s thus
cannot count on their organizations’ purpose and place
in society being immediately obvious to the outside ob-
server. What components does the narrative about be-
ing a think tank consist of in such a setting? how do these
components relate to the cultural and historical traits of
the institutional environment? and how do they reflect
the think tank as an institutional ‘newcomer’ in this par-
ticular setting?
Our discussion is based on a qualitative, interview-
based study of four Swedish think tanks and of the ways
in which their directors, staff and board members un-
derstand and portray the nature and roles of their or-
ganizations. Swedish civil society has during the 20th
century been dominated by broad, membership-based
and democratically structured organizations with strong
grassroots orientation, and with a strong position in the
corporatist Swedish policy system—i.e., so-called popu-
lar movements (folkrörelser). Think tanks are a relatively
new phenomenon in this context, and it is a type of actor
still very much in search of its proper place in Swedish
civil society and the Swedish policy arena (Åberg et al.,
2019). This provides us with a unique opportunity to ex-
plore think tanks’ self-image ‘in the making,’ while it is
still being negotiated. As these organizations in many re-
spects clearly diverge from traditional forms of Swedish
civil society organizing, we are also interested in the ex-
tent to which their differentiation from other, more tradi-
tional grassroots oriented types of actor, is a part of their
self-understanding.
Inspired by Medvetz (2012), we focus less on what
a ‘real’ think tank is, and more on how these orga-
nizations, by labelling themselves think tanks and as-
cribing to themselves certain characteristics, collectively
contribute to constructing the ideal-typical think tank.
The collective dimension is important here, aswewant to
explore the extent to which think tanks in a particular na-
tional institutional setting develop a shared understand-
ing (cf. Fligstein & McAdam, 2012) of their own nature
and purpose.
2. Think Tanks in Civil Society and in the Policy System
While the sphere of civil society is often associated with
grassroots empowerment and conceptualized as a space
for ordinary citizens to collectively strive to transform so-
ciety, the emergence of the think tank as an increasingly
visible actor in this space has often been interpreted as a
sign of an elitist turn in civil society and policy-making
(e.g., Fischer, 1991; Savage, 2016; Smith, 1991; Stone,
2001). One of the few things that the extant think tank
literature appears to agree on is the elite-oriented char-
acter of these organizations. There are, at the same time,
different interpretations of how this elitism should be
understood. In the classical debate between elitist and
pluralist perspectives on U.S. American politics, think
tanks have often been portrayed by elite theorists as
tools for advancing the interests of an increasingly global
corporate-political elite (e.g., Domhoff, 2009, 2010; Dye,
2001; Peschek, 1987) and as vehicles for the neo-liberal
ideas that are seen as supporting those interests.
Most think tank scholars, however, conceptualize the
exclusive—or exclusionary—character of these organi-
zations in wider, more general terms. Rather than the
representation of particular class’s interests, think tank
elitism is linked here to their technocratic outlook, the
exclusivity of their ‘products,’ and their claims to exper-
tise and intimate knowledge of public policy processes.
In this understanding, think tank professionals are seen
as part of a new rising political class consisting ofmanage-
rial and policy experts or the ‘technically trained knowl-
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edge elites’ (Fischer, 1991). Stone (2001) notes, for ex-
ample, that think tanks cater to those ‘politically and
economically literate,’ are populated by highly educated
individuals from privileged backgrounds, and that their
frequent interactions with political and administrative
decision-makers allow them to acquire considerable in-
fluence (Stone, 2001). She draws attention to access and
participation in think tanks not normally being open to
the general public and sees their expert status as a form
of exclusiveness.
In his seminal work on think tanks from 2012,
Medvetz divides society into 1) the political and bureau-
cratic field, which includes actors such as state agencies,
social movements, and political parties; 2) the field of
cultural production, which includes universities but also
for instance policy journals; 3) the media field, including
for instance newspapers and magazines; and 4) the eco-
nomic field, which in Medvetz’s model contains corpo-
rations as well as labour unions and trade associations
(Medvetz, 2012). It should be noted that the four fields
mentioned overlap each other and the space of think
tanks is chiselled out in the middle of all this. Savage
(2016) argues that the interstitial position of think tanks
noted by Medvetz in itself contributes to their elite char-
acter. Savage sees the intersections of the four spheres
where think tanks reside as containing society’s core insti-
tutions, which themselves are dominated by highly influ-
ential, ‘elite’ actors. Think tanks’ links to these spheres
give them, in his view, a unique ability to influence the
formation of public opinion, the construction of politics,
and the development of policy.
The question of the extent to which the think tank
should be regarded as being, in some sense, an elite type
of actor, depends of course to a considerable extent on
howwe define this organization in the first place. As indi-
cated in the introduction, the simple question of ‘what is
a think tank’ generates multiple, often vague, and even
contradictory answers. Since the term itself is empirical
rather than analytical, its more precise meaning appears
to be very context-bound (Åberg et al., 2019; Kelstrup,
2016). What is understood as a think tank in a certain in-
stitutional context; which organizations call themselves
(or are referred to as) think tanks in that context; and
which of these organizations perform the tasks and roles
usually ascribed to think tanks, may, therefore, be three
very different things.
The issue of defining think tanks is further compli-
cated by the fact that, as Medvetz (2012) notes, the
think tank label has over time become a rhetorical tool
of its own, used for strategic purposes by actors wishing
to position themselves in the relevant social structure.
As the term ‘think tank’ invokes images of scientific ob-
jectivity and rigour (Pautz, 2007), to be awarded this la-
bel is, for some organizations and in some contexts, “to
rise abovemere interest-group struggles and claimmem-
bership in the ranks of experts” (Medvetz, 2012, p. 34).
For others, and in other contexts, it may, on the other
hand, mean being degraded from a ‘respectable’ aca-
demic research institute to a mere ideological hothouse.
Medvetz proposes, therefore, a relational, rather than es-
sentialist, approach to defining think tanks. Pointing to
the ways in which the think tank concept and the use of
the term have developed historically he argues that ‘the
think tank’ should be understood and treated as a discur-
sive creation rather than an objectively existing type or
category of organizations with an objectively defined set
of characteristics. This is also the approach adopted in
this article.
Inspired by Bourdieu, Medvetz analyses the push-
and-pull processes through which think tanks, in the
U.S. American context, on the one hand, draw differ-
ent forms of capital from the institutional spheres that
they span, and on the other hand, how they strive to
play down their links to these spheres and their actors
in order to retain the image of autonomy and distinctive-
ness. Think tanks perform thus continuous balancing acts
where they need to project both proximity to, and dis-
tance from, academia, the media, politics, and the eco-
nomic field (Medvetz, 2012). Policy experts involved in
think tanks build their professional identity on the idioms
associated with each of the spheres—those of the aca-
demic scholar, the policy aid, the media specialist, and
the entrepreneur—and attempt to reconcile them into a
coherent whole (Medvetz, 2010).
Medvetz posits that the reason behind the need for
this balancing act is the relative novelty of the think tank
as an organizational actor, and of the think tank policy
expert as a professional role, entailing a lack of ready-
made templates or idioms of their own that these or-
ganizations and their staff are able to draw on when
constructing narratives about who they are and what
they do. This assumption is, presumably, based on a
comparison with the four much more established insti-
tutional spheres and the professional roles associated
with them, that Medvetz sees think tanks as drawing on.
‘Novelty’ is, however, also relative. In comparison with
countries where such organizations have only started to
appear in the recent few decades, the U.S. American
think tank (which is the object of Medvetz’s analysis)
is a well-established type of actor, well integrated into
American civil society and the American policy system.
The question is thus, to what extent the narratives of
think-tank(er)s in countries where think tanks are insti-
tutional newcomers reflect a similar balancing act.
3. Think Tanks in Sweden: A Background
As noted above, think tanks are a relatively new phe-
nomenon in Swedish civil society and policy system;
while the first of this kind of organization has been
around since the 1930s in Sweden, it is only since
the turn of the Millennium that think tanks have be-
come a more visible type of actor in the Swedish pub-
lic arena (Åberg et al., 2019). During much of the 20th
century, most organizing in Swedish civil society fol-
lowed the ‘popular movements’ model, inspired by the
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powerful temperance, free-church, agricultural, labour,
women’s, sports, and environmental movements (Götz,
2003; Micheletti, 1995; Wijkström, 2011). This domi-
nant model encouraged grassroots oriented organizing
based on mass membership, internal democracy, and a
focus on advocacy and interest representation. As part
of the Swedish corporatist system, movement organiza-
tions were for a long time treated as a partner to the gov-
ernment (Götz, 2003), with the state lending them po-
litical legitimacy as well as financial and structural sup-
port. The involvement of movement organizations, but
also other similarly organized interests such as trade as-
sociations, in the development and implementation of
public policy was central to the so-called ‘Swedishmodel’
(Rothstein, 1992). The fact that several of the established
political parties had close links to one or the other of
the movements (Micheletti, 1995), combined with the
corporatist public policy system, meant that the move-
ments were able to provide the policy processes with
ideational and ideological content through many differ-
ent channels.
Today this no longer holds entirely true. Since the
1990s, the institutional civil society-state nexus has be-
gun to evolve towards a more pluralist policy system
(Blom-Hansen, 2000; Öberg et al., 2011). In the same
period, Sweden has experienced almost exponential
growth in the numbers of think tanks—from just a hand-
ful to around 40 in roughly two decades (Åberg et al.,
2019). Elsewhere we have shown that Swedish think
tank executives point to the decline of the corporatist
interest representation system, as well as to the rela-
tive stagnation of the popular movements, as having
helped create an institutional niche for the think tank
as a new type of policy-oriented actor in civil society
(Åberg et al., 2019). In particular, the slow decline of the
popular movement as the dominant organizing model in
Swedish civil society, and trends such as professionaliza-
tion, the rise of managerialism, as well as growing public
acceptance of new, alternative forms of organizing which
are less dependent on individual membership and demo-
cratic structures (see Papakostas, 2012;Wijkström, 2011,
2016) appear to have opened up a window of opportu-
nity for think tanks—or, perhaps, what Medvetz (2012)
would call a space of think tanks.
Not only Sweden’s civil society but also its political
and policy system has undergone important transforma-
tions during the same period as the number of think
tanks has risen. Svallfors (2016) points for example to the
diminishing importance of traditional policy actors such
as political parties, blue-collar trade unions, and similar
organizations; the decreasing visibility and intelligibility
of public policy processes; and the altered power balance
between labour and capital (to the latter’s advantage).
These institutional transformations have, he argues, coin-
cided with a decline in political participation among the
wider population, as well as with the rise of so-called
‘policy professionals’—a social category of people who
are interested in working with and influencing public pol-
icy, but not through the traditional, relatively transpar-
ent means such as publicly accountable electoral politics
or the hierarchical civil service. Rather, policy profession-
als exercise influence from behind the scenes, in more
informal (but no less influential) roles as political ad-
visers, political secretaries, public relations consultants,
lobbyists, or think tank policy experts (see also Garsten,
Rothstein, & Svallfors, 2015). The increasing importance
of policy professionals and their organizations (such as
think tanks) is, Svallfors contends, significative of a new
kind of elite-driven politics and policymaking, very unlike
the traditional corporatist structures of the 20th century.
At the same time, the traditional Swedish politi-
cal and policy system of the past was not necessarily
very egalitarian or grassroots oriented. While Sweden’s
movement-based civil society was largely organized ac-
cording to principles of mass participation, democratic
access, and grassroots engagement, the political system
itself has been described as top-down, centralized, and
expert-driven (Steinmo, 2003, 2010). Svallfors (2016) sug-
gests therefore that we should understand the recent
decades’ transformations less as a change from an egal-
itarian or populist system towards an elitist one, and
more as a turn towards a new type of elite politics, with
less transparency and accountability, and with new roles
for new kinds of experts.
Today think tanks are on their way to becoming an
established part of the Swedish public policy landscape
(see, e.g., Sörbom, 2018). While many of them are fairly
un-political and/or founded to work on one particular
issue only, the most prominent and visible of them be-
long (with a few exceptions) rather clearly in one of
two ideological-political spheres: the progressive sphere
which includes among others the labour movement and
the Social-Democratic Party, and the liberal pro-market
sphere which includes the right-of-centre parties as well
as the umbrella organizations of business and industry,
such as trade associations. Within these spheres, think
tanks are today among the more active and visible policy
actors. At the same time, they still to a certain extent con-
stitute an exotic feature in the policy landscape. Thus, we
argue that just as in other countries that have scarce pre-
vious experience of think-tanking (Boucher&Royo, 2009;
Desmoulins, 2009), think tanks in Sweden should be un-
derstood as still searching for their collective identity as
policy and civil society actors.
4. The Case Study: Design, Methods, and Cases
As mentioned above, previous research points out that
the Swedish think tank population consists of around
40, with the first currently operational think tank having
been founded at the end of the 1930s, and the majority
being founded since the year 2000 (Åberg et al., 2019).
Furthermore, most of these think tanks are rather small,
with the majority of them having between 1 and 10 em-
ployees, and diversewhen it comes to the ideologies and
interests that they represent.
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The empirical research discussed here is based on
a qualitative case study of four of the most influen-
tial Swedish think tanks. The researchers used a pur-
posive sampling technique to capture the most influen-
tial Swedish think tanks as well as cases from different
parts of the Swedish political spectrum. Three of the
think tanks represent different parts of the labour move-
ment, and one has a liberal/conservative orientation rep-
resenting more liberal market values and is connected to
the trade associations. The selected organizations vary
when it comes to such organizational characteristics as
size, age, turnover, staff numbers etc., giving us a rather
heterogeneous sample which resembles, but cannot be
seen as fully representative of, the Swedish think tank
population (see Åberg et al., 2019).
In the study, the self-understanding of the four orga-
nizations is explored through the eyes of the staff, since
these are the actors who are actively involved in the
construction, de- and re-construction of organizational
identity. As organizations operate through their employ-
ees, the opinions, beliefs, and conduct of the latter mir-
ror and become set into the organizational framework.
In each of the four organizations, we have conducted
semi-structured interviews with the CEO (or equivalent)
and additional staff holding titles such as head of com-
munications, head of publishing, chief economist, and re-
search officer. Since the size of the organization, includ-
ing the number of employees, varies between the organi-
zations not all positions exist in every organization but in
total, we conducted 16 interviews. The interviews lasted
between one and two hours. They were all recorded
and transcribed in verbatim, and subsequently analysed
using NVivo and thematic analysis (Bazeley & Jackson,
2013; Saldana, 2013). In order to keep the respondents
confidential, we anonymized the quotes but named the
respondents TxRx (Think tank x, Respondent x) in the
text to help the reader see how much analytical varia-
tion there is within think tanks and between think tanks
in the empirical material.
Data analysis proceeded in two steps. First, we went
through the interview transcripts using descriptive cod-
ing in order to create a rough inductive account of the
data (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Saldana, 2013). This de-
scriptive coding was done in several iterations as some
codeswheremerged andotherswere split apart andnew
codes also emerged from the data. The second step of
the data analysis used focused coding (Charmaz, 2006)
in order to create themes and subthemes from the first
order codes, related to the overarching identity-related
question of ‘who are we?’ These themes and subthemes
are presented below.
5. Analysis
Under the overarching headline of ‘who are we?’ our in-
terview data reveals four themes that consistently ap-
pear in the interviews across the studied think tanks.
They concern: the organization’s founding story, the re-
lationship between the think tank and the movement or
sphere it belongs to, the centrality of independence, and
the role of research in the identity of think tanks.
5.1. The Founding Story
All the four think tanks studied have an internally strong
and coherent founding story that describes them as
formed in response to an ideological development in so-
ciety that their founders wanted to counteract. This ap-
pears to be an important and distinctive component of
the narrative about what it entails to be a think tank for
the organizations studied. The ideological development
to be counteracted differs between think tanks, from the
Social Democratic hegemony in the 1960s and 1970s to
the neo-liberalism of the 1990s and 2000s, depending on
the time of the think tank’s establishment. As one of the
respondents remarks in this context: “Think tanks are in
some sense politically anti-cyclical” (Interview, T1R1).
The respondents at the more recently founded think
tanks place their stories on a timeline containing other,
already existing policy institutes, and describe the rea-
sons for their own creation as related to the need to
counteract the influence of those older think tanks. For
example, interviewees from the liberal market think tank
T4 refer to the near-total social democratic and labour
movement ideological and political hegemony in Sweden
of the previous decades. By establishing T4, the liberal
market sphere hoped to create more concentrated ideo-
logical resistance and respond to the large resources that
the labour movement dedicated to ideology and the pro-
duction of policy advice. Conversely, the three younger,
left-of-centre think tanks (T1, T2 and T3) were estab-
lished during the more recent period of the relative ide-
ological hegemony of market liberalism in Sweden, and
their accounts highlight the need within the progressive
sphere for policy-relevant research and they advise from
adifferent,more ‘leftist’ ideological angle. In this, the sto-
ries told by the think tanks from the two opposing ideo-
logical camps mirror each other almost perfectly.
The appearance of think tanks in the political and so-
cial landscape andwhen, how, and bywhom they are cre-
ated, is related to political and social transformations and
relations, as noted in Medvetz’s studies of think tanks in
the U.S. (Medvetz, 2012). Previous research also notes
that the advance of think tanks on the political arena and
in the public eye seems to coincide with reorientations
in the organizational and governance models in the U.S.
civil society (e.g., McGann & Weaver, 2000; Rich, 2004).
Such reorientations can also be spotted in Sweden. As
noted previously in this article, the popular movements,
and the popular movement organizations, have been the
dominant normative model for how collective mobiliza-
tion is expected to be organized in Sweden since the early
1900s. Recent decades have, however, unveiled a devel-
opment towards a civil society that also includes less
member-based and more professionalized organizations
(Papakostas, 2012; Wijkström & Einarsson, 2006).
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5.2. The Relationship to the Wider Sphere
In the interviews, the above-described role of counter-
acting an undesirable ideological development in soci-
ety is very consistently framed in terms of the organi-
zations’ embeddedness in broader movements or soci-
etal spheres: the left-of-centre ‘progressive’ sphere that
includes the labour movement, the trade unions, the
Social Democratic party etc. (T1, T2 and T3), and the
right-of-centre sphere made up of ideological and/or in-
terest groups which in different ways promote a liberal
market agenda in Sweden (T4). The respondents all talk
about the missions of their think tanks as being geared
towards filling particular niches or functions in ‘their’
movements and serving the need for professionalized
expert advice relating to the spheres that they belong
to. Several of them stress this as the core part of the
work of their organizations: “The Swedish Trade Union
Confederation and the Social Democratic Party, i.e., the
labour movement—these are the ones we should influ-
ence” (Interview, T2R5).
An important part of the think tank’s mission is thus
to shape the ideological development of their own politi-
cal camp. In this context, a long-term and more expert
oriented perspective becomes particularly important:
“I have difficulties seeing that a trade association could
do what a think tank does, because a trade association
has, by definition, a shorter time horizon, and they are
also very clearly lobby organizations” (Interview, T4R13).
Several of the respondents mention that many of
the other types of actors in civil society and in the
policy arena, especially the more grassroots oriented
membership-based organizations, have becomemore re-
active, and governed by the current political agenda.
Think tanks as small professionalized organizations, on
the other hand, can according to the respondents, play
a more long-term role in their movements; they do
not have to cater to the whims of members, voters or
principals, but are able to address and safeguard the
more long-term general interests of their constituents:
“[The trade unions] seem to havemuch shorter time hori-
zons, so all that they do is more connected to day-to-day
politics. That’s why we can do things that you cannot do
in a central organization” (Interview, T1R1).
The interviewees’ view of the added value of their
organizations appears also to include a strong element
of think tanks operating ‘outside of the box’ in a more
general sense, the ‘box’ being in this context the ways
in which policy advice work has traditionally unfolded
in Sweden, and something that other, more established
policy actors in their movements or spheres are per-
ceived as still being caught up in. Several of the respon-
dents expressed the view that think tanks, to a greater
extent than the more traditional policy actors such as
politicians, parties, unions, or interest groups through be-
ing small elite organizations are free to pursue their pol-
icy agendas. This puts think tanks, according to the inter-
views, in a unique position to be able to notice and pur-
sue important societal issues and needs that might pass
under the radar or be impossible to pursue for other pol-
icy actors:
I think they see a value in that there is an organiza-
tion that can think freely from the interests that gov-
ern the unions….An organization that can think a little
freer and in the slightly longer term also, which is not
constrained by the next collective bargaining process
or by what political parties will do or say in the near
future. (Interview, T1R2)
By being essentially different from other actors in their
own spheres, the think tanks can thus, according to these
accounts, provide an added value and take on tasks
that other, more traditional policy actors are less well
equipped to carry out. This distinctiveness, and more of
an elite profile, seems to be an important part of the self-
understanding of the ideal-typical Swedish think tank.
5.3. Independence
The third theme that consistently emerges from the in-
terviews as a particular trademark of think tanks is their
independence from other policy actors with more pro-
nounced political agendas. Such independence lends, in
the eyes of the respondents, a particular legitimacy to
the policy advice provided by their organizations:
This is not a trade union saying something….This is not
the Social Democrats. The good thing is that here we
have gathered…a few people who can think for them-
selves, who dare to think for themselves, who have
the mandate to think for themselves. What comes
from us, it comes from us, it does not come from any-
one else. (Interview, T2R5)
It seems utterly important that a think tank has its own in-
dependent voice and that it is not perceived as being con-
trolled by the movement it belongs to, or by anyone else.
The argument thus seems to be that the think tank gains
legitimacy by being an insulated elite professionalized
organization rather than by being a membership-based
grassroots organization. Importantly, however, this is not
only about appearing legitimate in the eyes of the exter-
nal environment. It is also, and crucially, a matter of the
formal independence allowing think tanks to speak un-
comfortable truths, and express unpopular views which
may in the short run go against the interests of poten-
tially powerful actors in the sphere to which the think
tank itself belongs:
[Our principals] have outsourced some difficult de-
bates to us….They need to have an independent or-
ganization that can run a consistent market liberal
agenda since there are issues that are good for the
market economy at large, but that can be bad for an
individual company. (Interview, T4R13)
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5.4. The Relationship to Research
Finally, the relationship to (academic) research appears
as a central theme in the respondents’ understanding
of the essence of their organizations. Here we discern a
clear need for distinction from other types of actors in
the academia:
I would not say that we are an academic research in-
stitution. We are so small, and we do not have the
ambition to claim to be [an academic research institu-
tion] either, but much of what we do here is research-
based. Over the years, we have done a lot of things
that onemight categorize as research. Many of the re-
port and book authors thatweworkwith are academi-
cians and scholars. And of course, we have the ambi-
tion to increase this in the long term. (Interview, T1R3)
None of the four think tanks studied, which are some
of the largest and most active in Sweden, say that they
produce original research. Rather, they see their contri-
bution in terms of ‘repackaging’ research that has been
conducted elsewhere:
What we do differently from a lot of universities is
that we have an organization that is extremely well-
equipped to package and communicate research. We
have an infrastructure for it in place, we have strong
credibility as well, and many stakeholders that give
us the opportunity to reach out with the material.
(Interview, T4R13)
In the eyes of the interviewees, the added value—the
‘unique selling point’—of a think tanks lies, not only in
pure communication and re-packaging skills, neither is
it strictly about ‘research’ in terms of providing pure
facts, as these are often already accessible from public
sources. Instead, it is to a large extent about adding an
ideological dimension to the way in which facts are pre-
sented or ‘spun’: “The facts are there. They are [available
from] Statistics Sweden, they are already in the reports
from governmental investigations….But when we intro-
duce ideology to it, it becomes dynamite, so to speak”
(Interview, T2R6).
Several of our interviewees dwell on the ideological
steering of which kind of data is presented and how it
is presented:
If we make a report on the free school choice, for ex-
ample, and we know that the starting point is that we
do not believe that free school choice is a good idea,
then it is clear that we formulate the question in that
way, and bring in people who can scientifically show
that it is problematic. [The free-market think tank]
Timbromight think that the free school choice is good,
and then they bring in researchers who show that it is
good, but both researchers can still be independent
people anyway. (Interview, T2R5)
While the relationship to research emerges strongly in
the interviews, it is framed in terms of what ‘think tank-
ing’ is not; it is not about pure academic knowledge but
rather about arriving at a research-based product with
an ideological angle—thus it differs from both scholar-
ship and from propaganda. At the same time, the respon-
dents were very careful in explaining that their policy ad-
vice is soundly anchored in academic research and qual-
ity assurance processes.
6. Discussion
The interview data discussed above shows a somewhat
unexpected coherence in the way the interviewed heads
and staff of the four think tanks studied appear to per-
ceive the essence of ‘think tanking.’ The organizations in-
cluded in the study differ from each other in several di-
mensions such as age, size, and political affiliation. Yet,
the respondents’ accounts of why their organizations
were established, of the ways in which they differ from
other types of policy actors, and of the niche(s) that they
fill in the policy arena, are very consistent and similar
to each other. In many cases, the respondents speak
of their own organizations, but just as often they speak
about think tanks in general, thus positioning themselves
in an organizational category that in their eyes clearly
has specific and unique characteristics. This may be in-
terpreted as pointing towards a shared understanding of
think tank identity in Sweden, with particular traits that
everyone agrees on as central to such an identity. At least
it indicates a collective work among think-tankers to con-
ceptualize think tanks as a distinct type of organizational
actor in Swedish civil society, which is differentiated both
from the classic American think tank discussed in the lit-
erature (cf. Medvetz, 2012) but also from the traditional
Swedish popular movement organizations. Thus, those
active in Swedish think tanks carve out their own space,
the Swedish space of think tanks (cf. Medvetz, 2012), in
between being connected to and being independent of
Swedish popular movements.
The literature on think tanks has previously high-
lighted their position in between different institutional
fields, particularly those of academia, politics, media and
economics, as well as their need to distinguish them-
selves from the organizational actor types prominent in
these fields (Hauck, 2017; Medvetz, 2012). The respon-
dents in our study do mention universities and research
institutes as two types of academic actors that they see
their own organizations as being different from. There
is, however, no mention of media actors in the themes
we have identified in the interviews. Instead,we find that
the organizations studied to a large extent construct their
identities in opposition to, or through distinction from,
actors in what Medvetz (2012) would call the political
and bureaucratic field as well as the economic field—
particularly towards actors in the movements or ideo-
logical spheres to which they belong as discussed above.
They appear to perceive a need to highlight both their
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strong embeddedness in their own ideological spheres
and the added value, the ‘unique selling point,’ that they
bring to those spheres. An interesting find in the Swedish
context is that most of the think tanks studied, which are
among the most prominent Swedish think tanks, have
strong ties to either labour unions or to trade associa-
tions even though their (at least professed) ideology and
the issues they focus on are more akin to what is usu-
ally connected to social movements and political parties,
which can be reflected upon in the light of themodel con-
structed by Medvetz (2012) which has been discussed
previously in this article.
It seems that the most central and distinctive organi-
zational characteristic is centred around a founding story
inwhich the think tank is created to counteract an unfold-
ing and undesirable (ideological) development in society.
This is further reinforced in those of the younger think
tanks which clearly place the older think tanks from the
‘other side’ as their main adversaries and the reason for
their creation. This may both be seen as an attempt to
give their own think tank a distinct identity but also as
an attempt to collectively place themselves within the
Swedish discourse of popular movements and thus cre-
ate legitimacy for the organizational type by being at-
tached to a social movement or societal sphere. At the
same time, another very important organizational trait
is being independent of other actors, including those
within their own ideological sphere or movement. This
independence is often seen as a prerequisite for think
tanks to be able to fulfil their role as long term and proac-
tive ideology producers, two other important building
blocks of the ideal-typical think tank identity. A balanc-
ing act akin to which that Medvetz (2012) describes in
his seminal work on think tanks.
In the eyes of think tankers, by being free frommany
of the constraints that the more traditional policy actors
face (such as large organizational bureaucracies, party
political considerations, member or voter demands, etc.)
as well as by adding a distinctly ideological twist to the
research results that they re-package and disseminate,
think tanks can provide the public debate with some-
thing that no one else can: ideologically grounded, realis-
tic, and far-sighted policy advice. In this context, the stud-
ied think tanks’ apparent need for differentiation from
more traditional Swedish civil society actors has a clear
elite–grassroots dimension.
In the interviews, the ability of the think tanks to
survive and act in a politically anti-cyclical climate is
frequently linked to those of their traits that—in our
conceptualization—place them at the elite end of the
elite–grassroots continuum: expertise, professionalism,
flexibility, and independence. Think tanks connected to,
or working in opposition to, different movements and
grassroots organizations can, according to our respon-
dents, take advantage of these traits as insulated elite
professional organizations to approach issues and apply
perspectives that are more difficult for larger grassroots-
oriented organizations to address. In the eyes of our in-
terviewees, think tanks can thus be the actor and the
voice that the more traditional organizations in their
movements or spheres cannot be, especially in times of
an adverse political climate. The ease with which our
interviewees point to the advantages that their more
elite-profiled character provides for their movements
or spheres might be interpreted as a sign of a chang-
ing norm regarding organizing in civil society in Sweden
(cf. Wijkström, 2011).
An interesting next step in research on the Swedish
think tank landscapewould be to lookmore closely at the
individuals inhabiting and working inside the think tanks
to further our understanding of how they build up their
own professional identities. As noted above, Medvetz
(2010) argues that think tank staff, i.e., what he calls
policy experts, create their identity using building blocks
from the four different spheres of academia, politics, eco-
nomics, and media. Would the same patterns be evident
in a Swedish context given that the interviewees in this
study did not emphasize all of these areas?
Previous research on think tanks highlights the diffi-
culty of defining these organizations, with the think tank
concept being seen as empirical, slippery, and hard to tie
to a number of clear characteristics. A takeaway from the
study is that research on think tanks needs to take con-
textual factors that may affect the identity of this type of
organization more into account.
Swedish think tanks operate in a policy environment
which for the last century has been centred around two
distinct ideological spheres, but which has also in the last
three decades seen a significant ideological shift in so-
ciety. These two institutional factors appear to be cen-
tral to the self-understanding of the organizations stud-
ied.While the importance of the national institutional ar-
chitecture for the role and function of think tanks in soci-
ety has already been approached in the literature (Åberg
et al., 2019), the results of the present study point to
such architecture being central also to the way in which
think tanks collectively work on constructing their and
others’ shared understanding of what think tanks are.
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